Commentary: Asia’s playbook for Trump’s tariff storm
Global markets and economies are still struggling to absorb the seismic tariff shock unleashed last week. There seems to be no end of risk aversion and market selloff. The key reason for that is that despite the spate of announcements, there is still substantial fear that more measures are to come. Perhaps more critical is the notion that nations trying to do a deal with the US will not be able rest easy upon signing agreements, as no deal with US seems to be reliable any longer.
Before examining what Asia can and would do to deal with the tariffs, we first take stock of our US forecasts. If tariffs stay the way are for the rest of the year, core PCE inflation could readily exceed 3.5%, while household income and consumption will be dented, especially for those at the low end of the income spectrum. Real GDP growth could face 50-100bps downside. We will keep aside the impact on fiscal as whatever tariff revenues are raised will be more than offset by forthcoming tax cuts.
There is another, more adversarial, scenario. If trade war intensifies with additional tariffs and retaliations, and financial market correction worsens, US recession risks will rise considerably. This will especially be the case if the US ratchets up secondary tariffs (penalty on nations for buying goods from countries under US sanctions) and China/EU take aim at the US services exports. The Fed will face pressure to cut interest rates even if inflation remains well over its target. Global financial stability could also be at stake.
We would assign a probability of 45% to a scenario of below-trend growth and above-trend inflation, and a 35% probability to a US recession scenario, which in turn will drag down the outlook of Asia’s exports-dependent economies.
In the following sections, we present DBS economists’ analysis on the impact of tariffs on key economies and likely policy response.
Taimur Baig
China
We estimate that the direct impact of US tariffs imposed so far this would subtract 1.15% from China’s GDP. The actual impact could however end up being less severe as the US is raising tariffs on other countries, which could dilute the specific effect on China.
China is also better positioned to withstand the protectionist climate compared to the past. Burgeoning demand from emerging markets may help cushion the potential loss of trade income from the US. China has seen significant growth in exports to ASEAN, which accounted for 16.4% of its total shipments in 2024.
Meanwhile, the loss of trade income from the US may be partly offset by fiscal stimulus. Beijing will likely accelerate the issuance of the RMB4.4 trillion local government special bonds and RMB1.8 trillion special sovereign bonds to support the economy.
The PBOC may return to easing to support the economy. We expect another 30 basis points of 1-year LPR and 100 basis points of RRR cut this year, in tandem with the resumption of the government bond buying program.
Mo Ji, Nathan Chow, Samuel Tse, Byron Lam
Hong Kong
While not explicitly targeted, Hong Kong's 2020 loss of preferential trade status subjects it to equal treatment with mainland China under US trade regulations. The direct impact on domestic exports is minimal—these account for just 1.3% of total exports in 2024, with only a small share destined for the US—but re-export activity may experience some drag. Still, the US now comprises only 5–6% of Hong Kong’s total trade, a sharp decline from a decade ago, which helps contain the overall impact. Resilience will depend on deepening economic integration with mainland China and expanding ties with ASEAN and the Middle East.
A stabilizing Chinese economy—underpinned by fiscal stimulus and monetary easing—should support Hong Kong’s re-export flows. The city is also expected to accelerate efforts to strengthen supply chains, broaden trade financing, and diversify market exposure. In real estate, a weaker re-export and investment outlook could dampen office demand from multinationals, though increased interest from mainland firms may offer some offset. Residential demand may soften if sentiment weakens, but continued mainland wealth inflows and enhanced cross-border connectivity should provide support. Further relaxation of property measures is likely if market conditions deteriorate. Overall, we estimate a 0.5–1%ppt downside risk to our 2025 GDP growth forecast of 2.5%.
Mo Ji, Nathan Chow, Samuel Tse, Byron Lam
Singapore
With the balance of risks to Singapore’s growth and inflation outlook skewed to the downside, we expect the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to ease its monetary policy during its upcoming policy review in April 2025. This would mark a back-to-back easing, following MAS’s slight reduction of its SGD NEER policy band in January 2025.
Policymakers are already sounding caution, with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry Gan Kim Yong mentioning that the situation has “turned out to be worse” than expected, following the US tariff announcement. Singapore will have to reassess its 1-3% economic growth forecast for 2025, considering the potential for fresh US tariffs to escalate into a tit-for-tat global trade war.
Singapore’s deep integration in the global supply chain makes it vulnerable to a broader global trade and manufacturing slowdown induced by sweeping US tariffs, posing considerable downside risks to our 2025 economic growth outlook. Nonetheless, we see a silver lining compared to other hard hit Southeast Asian economies, as it faces the baseline 10% US tariff rate, the lowest amongst ASEAN-6 peers.
We estimate lower direct negative growth impact of 0.50-0.75 percentage points (ppt) to our Singapore 2025 GDP growth forecast of 2.8%, with the negative impact mitigated by the exemption of additional reciprocal rates on pharmaceutical and semiconductor products. We still foresee pipeline risk of US tariffs on these goods, which would pose a bigger direct drag to Singapore’s economy.
Chua Han Teng
India
The US announced a 26% reciprocal tax on India, which is more than two and a half times of the existing average tariff gap. With the effective reciprocal taxes likely to be implemented on April 9, we will wait to see if India manages to receive some reprieve.
The authorities have engaged in negotiations with the US in the past few months, including openness to cut or scrap tariffs on part of US imports, and lower tariffs on selected US agriculture imports but exclude key segments, amidst negotiations on the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), with the initial contours to be released by fall of 2025. As it stands, the rate imposed on India is less than most Asean-6 peers, with sectoral carve outs/ exemptions providing temporary relief. However, exemptions add to a little more than a tenth of the total exports to the US, with other sectors still exposed to higher tariffs. India retains comparative advantage in specific sectors like electronics manufacturing for now as key competitor countries face higher tariffs.
Our growth impact framework, which marries export elasticities and bilateral trade/ sector flows, signals about 0.5% of GDP downside risk for India. Authorities have steered clear from retaliatory action, instead counting on a successful conclusion of the ongoing bilateral trade agreement with the US next quarter to lower the effective tariff rate. The RBI is expected to lower rates by 50-75bp more this year, in addition to February 2025’s move.
Radhika Rao
Indonesia
A significant increase in reciprocal tariff on Indonesia came as a surprise. The US announced a 32% tariff on Indonesia, likely influenced by the trade balance gap rather than purely the difference in the bilateral tariff rates. The latest USTR National Trade estimate Report highlights Indonesia’s average MFN applied tariff rate at around 8% in 2023, whilst expressing concern on progressive increase in import tariffs, a cumbersome domestic tax assessment process, and increase in the withholding tax rates on selected imports, apart from zooming in on the non-trade barriers including import licensing mechanism including on agricultural products, quantitative restrictions/ import limits, limited access in the pharma industry and state trading, amongst others. Local content requirements on certain information and communication technologies to sell products was also cited as a constraint, likely referring to negotiations with Apple in recent months.
China’s dominance in Indonesia’s trade and investment landscape was expected to be a potential flashpoint. Key exports to the US include textiles, seafood, footwear, palm oil, electronics etc. The government has signalled scope for negotiations to reach some compromise and receive relief on these rates. Our impact analysis points to 0.5% of GDP knock-on repercussion on growth, with second order effects from slower global growth. In a fractious global economy, we expect domestic policymakers to step up on boosting demand engines. BI is expected to lower rates by 50bp more, with an eye on rupiah volatility. Domestic considerations had dented sentiments in the onshore markets, weighing on the currency and bond markets.
Radhika Rao
ASEAN-6
ASEAN-6 is amongst the hardest hit by US reciprocal tariffs, even as the region was not explicitly mentioned in the “Fair and Reciprocal Plan.” The region faces a potential average 27.5% increase in their US tariff rates, with Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia facing the highest increases (ranging from 46% on Vietnam to 24% on Malaysia), as they were amongst the US’s top 15 trade deficit partners in 2024.
To assess the direct impact on ASEAN’s growth, we considered the US reciprocal tariff rates, alongside US exports exposure and elasticities, as well as exemption of additional reciprocal rates for few key sectors such as semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and autos exports to the US. We estimate a significant hit to the region, with greater negative impact on the GDP of Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam ranging from 1.0-2.5 percentage points (ppt). Vietnam, which faces amongst the highest reciprocal rates, is also the most exposed to the US. US accounts for almost 30% of the total Vietnam goods exports, with key segments comprising of electronics items, such as mobile phones, and textiles, garment, and footwear.
Regional governments are likely to initiate bilateral discussions and seek concessions with the US administration as the scale and scope of reciprocal action become clearer. A broad range of conciliatory options include diplomatic and other economic steps - bilateral trade agreement/ critical minerals agreement (applicable for Indonesia for instance) with the US.
The region might seek to step up purchases from the US, for instance agricultural inputs, machinery, aircrafts, energy and defence, to balance the trade gaps. A unilateral reduction in tariffs to accommodate US demands (without an FTA) might be challenging given the need to level the playing field with all the countries under the MFN terms.
Concurrently, there might be cascading tariffs in the region as any instance of dumping activity from China or other trading partners might attract countervailing duties. National governments and policymakers are likely to double down on efforts to bolster domestic demand to compensate for weaker trade performance including fiscal spending and monetary policy easing.
Chua Han Teng and Radhika Rao
Japan
Japan faces a 24% reciprocal tariff rate, which is relatively low compared to the average of 29% across the 60 countries in the reciprocal tariff list. However, Japan also faces a 25% increase in automobile tariffs, the largest product category it exports to the US. Assuming a price elasticity of 0.5, Japan’s GDP growth is likely to be reduced by approximately 0.3 ppt.
The Bank of Japan is likely to delay its next rate hike, despite recent strong wage and inflation data. The positive wage-inflation dynamics could be at risk if global economic conditions deteriorate sharply. Additionally, the strong appreciation of the yen—driven by a surge in safe-haven demand—will make the BOJ cautious about implementing domestic rate hikes.
Ma Tieying
South Korea
South Korea is subject to a 25% reciprocal tariff rate, which is relatively low compared to the 29% average tariff across 60 countries on the list. Additionally, South Korea faces a 25% tariff hike on its automobile exports to the US, the largest category of products it exports to the country. With an assumed price elasticity of 0.5, the 25% tariff hike is expected to reduce South Korea’s GDP growth by approximately 0.7ppt.
Growth risks are likely to prompt further monetary easing by the Bank of Korea. The BOK is expected to cut the benchmark rate by another 25 bps to 2.50% during the April 17 policy meeting. Substantial government policy support is anticipated following the upcoming presidential election. On April 4, the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment of President Yoon, leading to a new election within 60 days, which is expected to occur by early June. The new government is likely to engage with the Trump administration to find a solution, which may include increasing imports from the US and boosting manufacturing investment in the US. If the opposition Democratic Party wins the election, the chances of fiscal stimulus through a supplementary budget would increase.
Ma Tieying
Taiwan
Taiwan’s reciprocal tariff rate is unexpectedly high at 32%. In 2024, Taiwan’s exports to the US accounted for 23% of total exports and 14% of nominal GDP. Its total exports accounted for 63% of GDP. Assuming an elasticity of 0.5, a 32% reciprocal tariff could reduce Taiwan’s exports to the US by 16%, lowering GDP growth by approximately 2 ppt. Regarding second-order impacts, if global economic growth decreases by 1 ppt, it could reduce Taiwan’s GDP growth by nearly 1 ppt.
Semiconductors are not subject to reciprocal tariffs, so the direct impact on Taiwan-made chips remains minimal for now. However, the second-order effects of a potential US/global recession, which could dampen semiconductor demand, would still be considerable. A strong policy response is necessary to mitigate the impacts of reciprocal tariffs. With government debt at around 30% of GDP, it also has significant room for fiscal policy expansion. Monetary policy easing seems unlikely in the near term, as the central bank’s policy rate is already low at 2.00%, and the inflation-adjusted real policy rate is near zero.
Ma Tieying
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